A former corrections officer arrested for distribution a pain killer should not be denied a disability retirement because of this off-duty wrongdoing, as per the Appellate Court in Coughlin v Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System. Here, the scope of the wrongdoing was limited—two tablets to a private individual in a private car in a commercial parking lot. The connection of this off-duty illegal act to the pension requirements was improper.
Gabrielle L. Strich, Esq.
Call us with more questions at 732-438-3880 or visit our web site at www.strichlaw.com.
Disclaimer: Any and all information contained on this site is for informational purposes, and should not be utilized as a substitute for a full, in-person consultation with a lawyer in your State and familiar with your circumstances. Strich Law Firm, P.C. assumes no responsibility for any information contained on this site, and disclaims all liability in respect of such information. In addition, no part of this site shall be deemed to form any contract between Strich Law Firm, P.C. , and anyone viewing this site.
--Tagged under: EMP--
--Tagged under: employment--
--Tagged under: employment--
--Tagged under: employment law--
--Tagged under: empl--
--Tagged under: employment claim--
--Tagged under: empl--
--Tagged under: employment issue--
--Tagged under: retirement--
--Tagged under: labor--
--Tagged under: labor law--
--Tagged under: illegal act--
--Tagged under: criminal act--
--Tagged under: off duty actions--
In Henry v. Department of Human Services, an employee resigned in 2004 after having her request for reassignment denied. The reason given for refusal of her request may have been a pretext to cover up racial discrimination, which may have misled her into not pursuing the issue. The New Jersey Supreme Court decided, in a decision approved for publication on December 10, 2010, 1. that her retaliation claim was time barred, as she was told in 2004 that if she had not complained she would have been reassigned, but 2. that a hearing was required to determine whether the discrimination claim itself was time barred as she may not have learned of it until 2006.
C. Megan Oltman, Esq.
Call us with more questions at 732-438-3880 or visit our web site at www.strichlaw.com.
Disclaimer: Any and all information contained on this site is for informational purposes, and should not be utilized as a substitute for a full, in-person consultation with a lawyer in your State and familiar with your circumstances. Strich Law Firm, P.C. assumes no responsibility for any information contained on this site, and disclaims all liability in respect of such information. In addition, no part of this site shall be deemed to form any contract between Strich Law Firm, P.C. , and anyone viewing this site.
--Tagged under: Employment law--
--Tagged under: discrimination--
--Tagged under: discovery rule--
In the Matter of the Expungement Petition of D.H., decided on 10/27/10 by the NJ Supreme Court, it was held that D.H. met the criteria for expungement pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-1 but that the forfeiture of public employment statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2, was separate and forfeiture is not automatically revoked with the expungement. D.H. was a public official who pleaded guilty to a disorderly persons offense that directly involved or touched the official’s public office. D.H. had no criminal history prior to the incident in question, nor was she involved with the law after the incident in question. D.H. wanted her record expunged and she wanted to be eligible for public office again. The Supreme Court felt that her record should be expunged but that the forfeiture statute still applied to D.H.
Gabrielle L. Strich, Esq.
Call us with more questions at 732-438-3880 or visit our web site at www.strichlaw.com.
Disclaimer: Any and all information contained on this site is for informational purposes, and should not be utilized as a substitute for a full, in-person consultation with a lawyer in your State and familiar with your circumstances. Strich Law Firm, P.C. assumes no responsibility for any information contained on this site, and disclaims all liability in respect of such information. In addition, no part of this site shall be deemed to form any contract between Strich Law Firm, P.C. , and anyone viewing this site.
--Tagged under: employment law--
--Tagged under: employment--
--Tagged under: expungment--
--Tagged under: public office forfeiture--
--Tagged under: disorderly persons offense--
U.S. District Judge Virginia Phillips in Riverside, California has issued a worldwide injunction against the enforcement of “Don’t Ask - Don’t Tell,” the Federal law which banned open homosexuals from service in the U.S. Armed Forces. Judge Philips held the law unconstitutional on September 9, 2010. The injunction bars the Armed Forces from discharging service men and women on the basis of their declared sexual preference, pending the appeal of the September 9 decision. Judge Phillips held that “there is no adequate remedy at law to prevent the continued violation of servicemembers’ rights or to compensate them for violation of their rights,” without the injunction.
C. Megan Oltman, Esq.
Call us with more questions at 732-438-3880 or visit our web site at www.strichlaw.com.
Disclaimer: Any and all information contained on this site is for informational purposes, and should not be utilized as a substitute for a full, in-person consultation with a lawyer in your State and familiar with your circumstances. Strich Law Firm, P.C. assumes no responsibility for any information contained on this site, and disclaims all liability in respect of such information. In addition, no part of this site shall be deemed to form any contract between Strich Law Firm, P.C. , and anyone viewing this site.
--Tagged under: Don't Ask Don't Tell--
--Tagged under: Discrimination--
--Tagged under: Armed Forces--
--Tagged under: Employment Law--
In a little discussed provision of the Affordable Health Care Act of 2010, employers are required to give nursing mothers both “a reasonable break time… to express breast milk for her nursing child for 1 year after the child’s birth,” and “a place, other than a bathroom, that is shielded from view and free from intrusion… which may be used… to express breast milk.”
Although passed as part of the Health Care Act, the “Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers” law is an amendment to the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act. As such, it applies to all employers engaged in interstate commerce of at least $500,000 per year. The law provides an exemption for employers of under 50 employees who can show that the requirements will impose an undue hardship on the business.
This law is great news for nursing mothers who need to work but want to continue to breast-feed their babies. In passing the new provision Congress explicitly recognized both the health benefits of breast feeding children, and how inappropriate and unsanitary it is to compel nursing mothers to express milk in the bathroom.
Interestingly, the law specifies giving reasonable break time to “express breast milk” but has no provision for actually nursing a baby during work hours. I sense a test case on the horizon!
C. Megan Oltman, Esq.
Call us with more questions at 732-438-3880 or visit our web site at www.strichlaw.com.
Disclaimer: Any and all information contained on this site is for informational purposes, and should not be utilized as a substitute for a full, in-person consultation with a lawyer in your State and familiar with your circumstances. Strich Law Firm, P.C. assumes no responsibility for any information contained on this site, and disclaims all liability in respect of such information. In addition, no part of this site shall be deemed to form any contract between Strich Law Firm, P.C. , and anyone viewing this site.
--Tagged under: labor law--
--Tagged under: labor--
--Tagged under: breast feeding--
--Tagged under: reasonable break time for nursing mothers--
--Tagged under: Fair Labor Standards Act--
--Tagged under: employment law--
--Tagged under: Health Care Act of 2010--
New Jersey case law provides that in a case of quasi-contract or implied contract of employment, the employee is entitled to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. However, a new case, Saccomanno v Honeywell International, Inc. provides that if there is a written employment contract, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not apply.
A quasi or implied contract exists where there is no written contract and actions, words and/or limited writings infer a contract of employment. An example of this would be if an employer suggested that an employee sell his/her home to move closer to work and that the employee can count on having his/her job. If the employee reasonably relies on these statements and incurs a detriment in such reliance, the employee would be entitled to due process relating to his/her employment. Without a written or implied contract, an employee may be terminated for any reason or no reason.
Gabrielle L. Strich, Esq.
Call us with more questions at 732-438-3880 or visit our web site at www.strichlaw.com.
Disclaimer: Any and all information contained on this site is for informational purposes, and should not be utilized as a substitute for a full, in-person consultation with a lawyer in your State and familiar with your circumstances. Strich Law Firm, P.C. assumes no responsibility for any information contained on this site, and disclaims all liability in respect of such information. In addition, no part of this site shall be deemed to form any contract between Strich Law Firm, P.C. , and anyone viewing this site.
--Tagged under: implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing--
--Tagged under: due process--
--Tagged under: employment law--
--Tagged under: breach of contract--
--Tagged under: temination--
--Tagged under: termination without due cause--
--Tagged under: termination without due process--
--Tagged under: terminable at will--
Arbitrators themselves get to decide if an arbitration agreement is unconscionable, the U.S. Supreme Court decided on Monday. This will make it harder for consumers and employees to challenge the fairness of arbitration agreements. The court held 5-4 in Rent-A-Center, West v. Jackson, that where an arbitration agreeement explicitly delegates to the arbitrator the issue of whether an arbitration agreement as a whole is unconscionable, it is the arbitrator, not a district court, who gets to decide the issue. The exception is where the consumer or employee has challenged the specific delegation clause. In real life, how many consumers or employeees have any idea they can challenge or object to a term of a contract? The decision “greatly limits the ability of consumers and employees to challenge the fairness of arbitration agreements,” according to Deepak Gupta of Public Citizen Litigation Group, who was co-counsel to appellee Antonio Jackson. For more detail read the New Jersey Law Journal coverage.
Justice Stevens issued a strong dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor. “Certain issues — the kind that ‘contracting parties would likely have expected a court to have decided’ — remain within the province of judicial review,” Stevens wrote. Those issues “raise questions the parties ‘are not likely to have thought that they had agreed that an arbitrator would’ decide.”
- C. Megan Oltman
Call us with more questions at 732-438-3880 or visit our web site at www.strichlaw.com.
Disclaimer: Any and all information contained on this site is for informational purposes, and should not be utilized as a substitute for a full, in-person consultation with a lawyer in your State and familiar with your circumstances. Strich Law Firm, P.C. assumes no responsibility for any information contained on this site, and disclaims all liability in respect of such information. In addition, no part of this site shall be deemed to form any contract between Strich Law Firm, P.C. , and anyone viewing this site.
--Tagged under: arbitration--
--Tagged under: arbitration clause--
--Tagged under: employment law--
--Tagged under: consumer law--
--Tagged under: U.S. Supreme Court--
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on Thursday that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) did not have the authority to issue over 600 decisions it issued in the last 2 years. The NLRB has had three vacancies on its five member panel for two years, and requires a working group of three members to issue decisions. A quorum of two in a working group can issue a decision, but not, the Supreme Court holds, if they are in fact the only two sitting members of the NLRB. The initial effect of this ruling in the case of New Process Steel v. National Labor Relations Board will be to send approximately 75 to 80 lower court cases challenging the legitimacy of two-member board decisions back to the NLRB. In addition, cases where the Board ordered an employee reinstated may result in new firings if those reinstatement decisions are all overturned.
- C. Megan Oltman
Call us with more questions at 732-438-3880 or visit our web site at www.strichlaw.com.
Disclaimer: Any and all information contained on this site is for informational purposes, and should not be utilized as a substitute for a full, in-person consultation with a lawyer in your State and familiar with your circumstances. Strich Law Firm, P.C. assumes no responsibility for any information contained on this site, and disclaims all liability in respect of such information. In addition, no part of this site shall be deemed to form any contract between Strich Law Firm, P.C. , and anyone viewing this site.
--Tagged under: labor--
--Tagged under: labor law--
--Tagged under: National Labor Relations Board--
--Tagged under: U.S. Supreme Court--
--Tagged under: employment law--
A nurse at Bayshore Community Health Services was not allowed to sue the hospital for a hostile work environment when the doctor in question only had privileges at the hospital because the privileges do not make the hospital the doctor’s employer. As such, the hospital cannot be held vicariously liable for the doctor’s actions. Further, the alleged conduct of defendant doctor did not rise to the level of severe or pervasive conduct necessary to maintain a cause of action for hostile work environment. The nurse’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, retaliation and aiding and abetting are denied. Colello v Bayshore Community Health Services, App. Div. (25-2-7699), April 2010.
Gabrielle Strich, Esq.
Call us with more questions at 732-438-3880 or visit our web site at www.strichlaw.com.
Disclaimer: Any and all information contained on this site is for informational purposes, and should not be utilized as a substitute for a full, in-person consultation with a lawyer in your State and familiar with your circumstances. Strich Law Firm, P.C. assumes no responsibility for any information contained on this site, and disclaims all liability in respect of such information. In addition, no part of this site shall be deemed to form any contract between Strich Law Firm, P.C. , and anyone viewing this site.
--Tagged under: aiding and abetting--
--Tagged under: assault and battery--
--Tagged under: employer--
--Tagged under: employer retaliation--
--Tagged under: hospital privileges--
--Tagged under: hostile work environment--
--Tagged under: intentional infliction of emotional distress--
--Tagged under: retaliation--
--Tagged under: severe or pervasive conduct--
--Tagged under: vicariously liable--
--Tagged under: employment law--
In a recent decision, the United States 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals held that in determining whether an employee was sufficiently incapacitated to warrant protecting her under the Federal Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the employee’s own word as to her illness was enough to raise a genuine issue of material fact. In Schaar v. Lehigh Valley Physicians, the 3rd Circuit held that an employee who had a doctor’s certification of illness for part of her absence, and her own testimony that she was not well enough to return to work for the remainder of her absence, was protected from retaliation under the FMLA.
FMLA provides that for employers of 50 persons or more, employees are entitled to up to 12 work-weeks per year of unpaid leave to care for an ill family member or for themselves when they are ill. Significantly, FMLA provides that employees cannot be fired, disciplined or have adverse action taken against them due to taking FMLA leave. In Scharr the plaintiff had a doctor’s note for two days of leave and stayed home a third day without any medical documentation because she did not feel she was yet well enough to return to work. The 3rd Circuit reversed the District Court and held that lay testimony, in other words the employee’s own testimony as to his or her medical condition, in combination with medical testimony, could establish that the illness was serious enough to justify the leave. The Court declined to go as far as have the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, which find that lay testimony may be sufficient all by itself to establish the seriousness of the illness for FMLA purposes.
In practical terms, this means that the burden on employees of establishing the need for FMLA leave has been lowered in New Jersey, Delaware and Pennsylvania. Significantly, all the U.S. Circuits that have dealt with this question have allowed lay testimony, at least in combination with medical testimony: the 3rd, 5th, 7th, 8th and 9th Circuits. This trend could make it easier for employees with partial, periodic disabilities to take the leave they need without a heavy burden of medical certification.
C. Megan Oltman
--Tagged under: 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals--
--Tagged under: FMLA--
--Tagged under: Family Medical Leave Act--
--Tagged under: United States Court of Appeals--
--Tagged under: disability--
--Tagged under: employ--
--Tagged under: employment--
--Tagged under: employment law--
--Tagged under: labor law--
