Suit against Law School for Deceptive Business Practices

In a difficult economy, there are no guarantees of employment, as many new law school graduates are discovering. Does this mean law schools are training too many lawyers? When I took the LSAT, way back in 1982, the essay question dealt with this issue: should law schools keep training lawyers if there were not enough jobs to go around? We test takers had to take an advocacy position in the essay, one way or the other.

A twist on this question is being played out right now in Alaburda v. Thomas Jefferson School of Law, a class action suit brought by recent graduates against the San Diego, California law school. The suit alleges that in order to keep bringing in students to pay the $135,000 plus bill for three years of law school, Thomas Jefferson School of Law has “adopted a practice of misrepresenting its post-graduation employment statistics.” The suit further alleges that the school conceals the fact that those graduates counted as “employed” in their statistics include those employed part-time and those employed in non-legal jobs.

It will be interesting to see how this plays out in court; the suit may have wide-ranging implications for how law schools recruit in the future. In the meantime, caveat emptor (buyer beware) - don’t pay big bucks for a graduate education without some clear idea of whether your advanced degree will buy you the kind of salary you are going to need.

C. Megan Oltman, Esq.

Call us with more questions at 732-438-3880 or visit our web site at www.strichlaw.com.

Disclaimer: Any and all information contained on this site is for informational purposes, and should not be utilized as a substitute for a full, in-person consultation with a lawyer in your State and familiar with your circumstances. Strich Law Firm, P.C.  assumes no responsibility for any information contained on this site, and disclaims all liability in respect of such information. In addition, no part of this site shall be deemed to form any contract between Strich Law Firm, P.C. , and anyone viewing this site.

--Tagged under: legal profession--

--Tagged under: law school--

--Tagged under: law jobs--

--Tagged under: legal education--

Copy of letter insufficient for probate but possible cure with handwritten note

In I/M/O Estate of Randall, 38-4-1372 Ch. Div. Essex County 2/1/11), the Court said a copy of a letter allegedly written by the decedent does not demonstrate sufficient testamentary intent to be probated.  However, in this case, there was a handwritten notation in the decedent’s handwriting that, in the context of the letter and the maintenance of keeping it in a safe place, and, as such, the letter and notation could be probated.

The rules for probate changed so that documents other than the original Will may be considered for probate. The key is illustration of testamentary intent by the decedent, including trustworthiness of the document.

Gabrielle L. Strich, Esq.

Call us with more questions at 732-438-3880 or visit our web site at www.strichlaw.com.

 

Disclaimer: Any and all information contained on this site is for informational purposes, and should not be utilized as a substitute for a full, in-person consultation with a lawyer in your State and familiar with your circumstances. Strich Law Firm, P.C.  assumes no responsibility for any information contained on this site, and disclaims all liability in respect of such information. In addition, no part of this site shall be deemed to form any contract between Strich Law Firm, P.C. , and anyone viewing this site.

--Tagged under: estate--

--Tagged under: estat--

--Tagged under: estate planning--

--Tagged under: probate--

--Tagged under: probate--

--Tagged under: copy of will--

--Tagged under: testamentary intent--

--Tagged under: no original will--

Child support arrears not subject to interest

A payee of child support filed a class action against the NJ probation department on its failure to charge post-judgment interest on child support arrears.  In Lerro v NJ Department of Family Development, Office of Child Support Services (App. Div. 2011), the Court held she did not have standing (was not an appropriate class of person) both on a federal or state basis to sue on this issue because she was not the intended beneficiary of the federal requirement to calculate interest periodically.

It is my experience that post judgment interest is generally not added to child support arrears, though I feel it would be more fair to do so.

Gabrielle L. Strich, Esq.

Call us with more questions at 732-438-3880 or visit our web site at www.strichlaw.com.

 

Disclaimer: Any and all information contained on this site is for informational purposes, and should not be utilized as a substitute for a full, in-person consultation with a lawyer in your State and familiar with your circumstances. Strich Law Firm, P.C.  assumes no responsibility for any information contained on this site, and disclaims all liability in respect of such information. In addition, no part of this site shall be deemed to form any contract between Strich Law Firm, P.C. , and anyone viewing this site.

--Tagged under: child support--

--Tagged under: child support arrears--

--Tagged under: arrears--

--Tagged under: interest--

--Tagged under: child support arrears interest--

--Tagged under: Lerro v NJ Department of Family Development--

--Tagged under: post judgment interest--

--Tagged under: standing--

No Loss of Retirement for Off-duty Illegal Act

A former corrections officer arrested for distribution a pain killer should not be denied a disability retirement because of this off-duty wrongdoing, as per the Appellate Court in Coughlin v Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System.  Here, the scope of the wrongdoing was limited—two tablets to a private individual in a private car in a commercial parking lot.  The connection of this off-duty illegal act to the pension requirements was improper.

Gabrielle L. Strich, Esq.

Call us with more questions at 732-438-3880 or visit our web site at www.strichlaw.com.

 

Disclaimer: Any and all information contained on this site is for informational purposes, and should not be utilized as a substitute for a full, in-person consultation with a lawyer in your State and familiar with your circumstances. Strich Law Firm, P.C.  assumes no responsibility for any information contained on this site, and disclaims all liability in respect of such information. In addition, no part of this site shall be deemed to form any contract between Strich Law Firm, P.C. , and anyone viewing this site.

--Tagged under: EMP--

--Tagged under: employment--

--Tagged under: employment--

--Tagged under: employment law--

--Tagged under: empl--

--Tagged under: employment claim--

--Tagged under: empl--

--Tagged under: employment issue--

--Tagged under: retirement--

--Tagged under: labor--

--Tagged under: labor law--

--Tagged under: illegal act--

--Tagged under: criminal act--

--Tagged under: off duty actions--

Business Judgment Rule Determinative in Evaluation of Stock Incentive Plan Awards

In Seidman v Clifton Savings Bank, S.L.A., (S.Ct. 2011), the NJ Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court decision finding that Clifton Savings Bank awards under their Stock Incentive Plan met the Business Judgment Rule and, as such, Seidman’s challenge was denied.

Clifton Savings Bank reorganized in 2004, issuing stock, of which 45% were made available to the public.  Seidman bought some of such stock.  In 2005, Clifton (via holding company Bancorp) issued a notice of the 2005 annual meeting, summarizing a Stock Incentive Plan to be enacted allowing for stock option grants and restricted stock awards to the board of directors and key staff.  The stockholder approved the plan.  

Clifton awarded the full possible amount of awards to its board of directors and key staff.  Seidman filed suit arguing that the incentive were not designed to retain service, left insufficient shares and options to attract new qualified people, were not consistent with any study or survey and constituted an unreasonable portion of Bancorp’s/Clifton’s net earnings. Seidman argued that disclosure of the stock plan was insufficient and that there was corporate waste.

The court held that once a stock incentive plan is approved or ratified by the stockholders, a challenger to the plan bears the burden of proving that the business judgment rule —-no person of sound business judgment would view the consideration furnished by the individual directors a fair exchange for the awards conferred—has not been met.   The distinction between whether an action constitutes corporate waste or is subject to the business judgment rule is one of substance; i.e. in the former case, the court will reverse the decision of the stockholders and, in the latter case, it will not.

Gabrielle L. Strich, Esq.

Call us with more questions at 732-438-3880 or visit our web site at www.strichlaw.com.

 

Disclaimer: Any and all information contained on this site is for informational purposes, and should not be utilized as a substitute for a full, in-person consultation with a lawyer in your State and familiar with your circumstances. Strich Law Firm, P.C.  assumes no responsibility for any information contained on this site, and disclaims all liability in respect of such information. In addition, no part of this site shall be deemed to form any contract between Strich Law Firm, P.C. , and anyone viewing this site.

 

--Tagged under: business--

--Tagged under: business law--

--Tagged under: cor--

--Tagged under: Corporate Law--

--Tagged under: co--

--Tagged under: corporation--

--Tagged under: business judgment rule--

--Tagged under: corporate waste--

--Tagged under: stock incentive plan--

--Tagged under: Seidman--

--Tagged under: Clifton Savings Bank--

New reproductive technologies: Parentage of a child born to a gestational surrogate

Shades of the Baby M case, in a new generation and a new context. A married heterosexual couple with an infertile wife and fertile husband, decides to have a child by means of a donor egg, fertilized in vitro with the husband’s sperm. They then have an embryo implanted in the uterus of a surrogate mother (not the egg donor), who agrees to carry the baby to term for them.

The New Jersey Parentage Act, N.J.S.A. 9:17-38 to-59, provides that the surrogate, who could be the biological mother of the child, or, in this case, the gestational mother, has 72 hours following the birth to choose whether or not to surrender her parental rights. You may remember the famous Baby M case in 1988 in which the surrogate (biological) mother had contracted with a couple to be inseminated with the husband’s sperm and bear a child for them, but later regretted her decision and took the child from the couple. The New Jersey Supreme court ultimately voided the surrogacy contract as against public policy, and remanded to the trial court which ultimately awarded the couple custody and gave the surrogate mother visitation rights.

In contrast in The Matter of the Parentage of a Child by T.J.S. and A.L.S., the gestational surrogate mother has not sought parental rights, but the couple involved sought a pre-birth judgment that the wife is the mother of the child, as contemplated in their contract with the surrogate. The Appellate Division declined to hold that the wife, A.L.S. is entitled to be considered the mother until after the expiration of the 72 hour waiting period following the birth.

The Appellate Division held that it is not a violation of equal protection to require the infertile wife to gain parental rights by adoption, after the expiration of the 72 hour waiting period, even though a husband whose wife is impregnated (with his consent) by artificial insemination, is deemed to be the father of the child even prior to birth. The court discussed the difference between the real, biological situations of men and women, indicating that the legislature had a rational reason for gaining children the support of a father in artificial insemination situations, and a different rational reason for respecting the rights of a woman who carries a child for 9 months, whether biologically related to her or not.

C. Megan Oltman, Esq.

Call us with more questions at 732-438-3880 or visit our web site at www.strichlaw.com.

Disclaimer: Any and all information contained on this site is for informational purposes, and should not be utilized as a substitute for a full, in-person consultation with a lawyer in your State and familiar with your circumstances. Strich Law Firm, P.C.  assumes no responsibility for any information contained on this site, and disclaims all liability in respect of such information. In addition, no part of this site shall be deemed to form any contract between Strich Law Firm, P.C. , and anyone viewing this site.

--Tagged under: parental rights--

--Tagged under: family law--

--Tagged under: adoption--

--Tagged under: New Jersey Parentage Act--

--Tagged under: surrogate mothers--

--Tagged under: equal protection--

S Corporation Shareholder Agreement

S Corporations shareholder agreements include an explanatory statement consent to S election, restriction on sale of the common stock, restrictive legend, request to transfer, transfer by reason of death, transfer in violation of agreemtn, stock issued or transferred in the future, revocation of S corporation election, termination, miscellaneous and signatures of shareholders as well as witnesses.

The explanatory statement sets out the intention of the company to be taxed as an S Corporation.  Each shareholder agrees to the election by the company of S corporation status and that they each will not act in a manner prejudicial to the S corporation status.  In addition, each shareholder agrees not to sell, assign, transfer etc. all of part of his/her shares except pursuant to the shareholder agreement.

Further provisions of the S Corporation shareholder agreement includes that each stock certificate must bear a conspicuous restrictive legend on the sale, transfer etc. of the stock.  If a shareholder wants to sell or transfer stock, the shareholder must give notice to the company of a specified period and the company must reasonably consent to the action requested.  However, if a shareholder transfers his or her stock in violation of the terms of the shareholder agreement, such transfer is void.

Call us with more questions at 732-438-3880 or visit our web site at www.strichlaw.com.

 

Gabrielle L. Strich, Esq.

 

FEDERAL TAX NOTICE - IRS rules mandate restrictions on federal tax advice by attorneys and accountants. If this correspondence or any attachments contain (or may be construed to contain) any federal tax advice, such advice is not intended or written to be used, and it cannot be used, by any taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding penalties that may be imposed on the taxpayer under federal tax laws.

Strich Law Firm, P.C.’s employees are not accountants. As such, tax information may not be relied upon for federal, state or other tax purposes. Rather, you should consult with an accountant for any tax advice.

ALSO, please remember that our business is referral based and let your friends and family know we would be happy to assist them with their legal and/or mediation needs.

 

Disclaimer: Any and all information contained on this site is for informational purposes, and should not be utilized as a substitute for a full, in-person consultation with a lawyer in your State and familiar with your circumstances. Strich Law Firm, P.C.  assumes no responsibility for any information contained on this site, and disclaims all liability in respect of such information. In addition, no part of this site shall be deemed to form any contract between Strich Law Firm, P.C. , and anyone viewing this site.

--Tagged under: S corporation--

--Tagged under: business law--

--Tagged under: corporate law; shareholder agreement;--

--Tagged under: transfer of shares--

Choosing an S Corporation for a business entity

In evaluating which form of corporation you want for your new business entity, an S Corporation has a number of benefits.  S Corporations cannot be more than 75 shareholders, though husband and wife, estates, certain trusts, tax-exempt charitable institutions, certain partnerships and other S corporations with a sole shareholder count as one shareholder.

The key benefits of an S Corporation are tax savings and liability protection. There is no double taxation because income and losses are passed through to shareholders and included on their individual tax returns.  In addition, if the corporation choosed to retain some of the income, the portion retained is not subject to Medicare tax.

Before an individual shareholder in an S Corporation is personally liable, the person or entity suing must piece its corporate veil, which is quite difficult.  However, there are special rules for professionals such as attorneys and accountants that limit the protection of a S Corporation.  Even in the latter case, the S Corporation provide a layer of liability protection to the individual shareholders.

Lastly, many shareholders enjoy the S Corporation benefit of receiving pay checks and a W2.

Call us with more questions at 732-438-3880 or visit our web site at www.strichlaw.com.

Gabrielle L. Strich, Esq.

FEDERAL TAX NOTICE - IRS rules mandate restrictions on federal tax advice by attorneys and accountants. If this correspondence or any attachments contain (or may be construed to contain) any federal tax advice, such advice is not intended or written to be used, and it cannot be used, by any taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding penalties that may be imposed on the taxpayer under federal tax laws.

Strich Law Firm, P.C.’s employees are not accountants. As such, tax information may not be relied upon for federal, state or other tax purposes. Rather, you should consult with an accountant for any tax advice.

ALSO, please remember that our business is referral based and let your friends and family know we would be happy to assist them with their legal and/or mediation needs.

Disclaimer: Any and all information contained on this site is for informational purposes, and should not be utilized as a substitute for a full, in-person consultation with a lawyer in your State and familiar with your circumstances. Strich Law Firm, P.C.  assumes no responsibility for any information contained on this site, and disclaims all liability in respect of such information. In addition, no part of this site shall be deemed to form any contract between Strich Law Firm, P.C. , and anyone viewing this site.

--Tagged under: S Corporation--

--Tagged under: Corporate law--

--Tagged under: business law--

--Tagged under: tax benefits--

--Tagged under: liability protection--

--Tagged under: form of corporation--

--Tagged under: shareholders--

--Tagged under: pierce the corporate veil--

Wage Garnishment of Child Support: the Whole Ordered amount to be garnished

The New Jersey Appellate Division just ruled in White v. St. Paul that where the trial court had ordered child support to be paid by garnishment of the payor parent’s wages, the full amount ordered was to be garnished, rather than allowing the payor parent to pay part of the amount directly outside of the garnishment. This ruling bolsters the right of the parent receiving support to have the payment obligation monitored by Probation. Good news for recipients, relief from the need to monitor and enforce.

C. Megan Oltman, Esq.

Call us with more questions at 732-438-3880 or visit our web site at www.strichlaw.com.

Disclaimer: Any and all information contained on this site is for informational purposes, and should not be utilized as a substitute for a full, in-person consultation with a lawyer in your State and familiar with your circumstances. Strich Law Firm, P.C.  assumes no responsibility for any information contained on this site, and disclaims all liability in respect of such information. In addition, no part of this site shall be deemed to form any contract between Strich Law Firm, P.C. , and anyone viewing this site.

--Tagged under: Family Law--

--Tagged under: Child Support--

--Tagged under: wage garnishment--

Ex-husband can engage in name-calling without rising to level of harassment

The New Jersey Appellate Division held yesterday that an “ordinary domestic contretemps” did not rise to the level of harassment required for imposition of a domestic violence restraining order. In E.D. v. P.D. the trial court had entered a restraining order where the ex-husband had repeatedly made belligerent telephone calls to his ex-wife at work, repeated called her names and gave her a “one-finger salute.” The Appellate Division held that these actions were not at a level the Legislature intended to designate as domestic violence.

C. Megan Oltman, Esq.

Call us with more questions at 732-438-3880 or visit our web site at www.strichlaw.com.

Disclaimer: Any and all information contained on this site is for informational purposes, and should not be utilized as a substitute for a full, in-person consultation with a lawyer in your State and familiar with your circumstances. Strich Law Firm, P.C.  assumes no responsibility for any information contained on this site, and disclaims all liability in respect of such information. In addition, no part of this site shall be deemed to form any contract between Strich Law Firm, P.C. , and anyone viewing this site.

--Tagged under: Family Law--

--Tagged under: domestic violence--

--Tagged under: harassment--

--Tagged under: restraining order--

Theme created by: Roy David Farber and Hunson. Powered By: Tumblr...
1 of 8